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INTRODUCTION
The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 has again raised the question as to whether
Egypt can lawfully close the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. Israel, since its estab-
lishment, has repeatedly demanded the same right of free passage accorded to other
nations, but Egypt has insisted on denying her such a right despite resolutions of
the United Nations Security Council calling on Egypt to terminate the restrictions
imposed on the passage of Israeli shipping and goods through the Suez Canal.1
The six-day war gave Israel the opportunity to demand again the opening of the
Canal to her shipping;2 but President Nasir, in his speech on November 24, 1967, two
days after the Security Council's resolution 242 had been adopted, calling for with-
drawal from occupied territory and termination of belligerency, declared in no
uncertain terms that "we shall never allow Israeli ships, whatever the cost, to pass
through the Suez Canal."3 Israel's demand and Nasir's rejection call for a reconsidera-
tion of the question in the light of the new circumstances brought about by the June
war and the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. It is not my purpose
to review the arguments of the two parties relative to the conditions preceding the
June war, except in so far as they relate to the conditions after the war, since they have
been thoroughly scrutinized by a number of scholars from the two opposing view-
points In order to examine the legal aspect of the closure of the Canal specifically
to Israeli shipping, I propose to deal with the question under three headings: (i) the
fundamental principles governing the present legal status of the Suez Canal; (2)
Israel's claim to the right of free passage; (3) Egypt's right to control of the Canal.
* B.A. 1932, American University, Beirut; Ph.D. 1938, University of Chicago. Director of the Center
for Middle East Studies, and Professor, The School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins
University. Author, INDEPENDENT IRAQ (1951); WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF IsLAm (1955); ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE (i96i); MODERN LIBYA (1963).
'The most important resolution was, of course, S.C. Res. 95 (i95i). It cited S.C. Res. 73 (1949)
and other resolutions and acts calling for the cessation of hostile acts and the resolution of outstanding
issues between the parties.
'See Abba Eban's speech at the Emergency Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on
June i9, x967, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1526 (1967) and subsequent declarations.
'For full text of the speech, see al-Ahiram, Cairo, Nov. 25, 1967. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1967, at 13, col. I.
'Two books might be cited which deal with the divergent views in detail: B. AvRAM, THE EvoLurioN
OF THE SUEZ CANAL STATUS PRom 1869 UP TO 1956 (1958), and J. OBIETA, THE INTzRNATIONAL STATUS
OF THE SuEz CANAL (960).
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL
When the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Egypt had not yet attained in-
dependence. Its territory was part of the Ottoman Empire. The Khedive of Egypt,
one of the Sultan's principal governors, had no power to act in entering into agree-
ments relating to foreign affairs without the approval of the Sultan. Thus, the
acts of concession issued by the Khedive in 1854, 1856, and 1866, granting the right
to connect the Mediterranean and the Red Seas by a canal and to operate it, had
to be ratified by the Sultan's firman (decree), issued on March 19, 1866, in order to
be valid under the Ottoman law in force in Egypt.a However, no rights were
derived from the concession by any third party nor was any surrender of the Sultan's
sovereignty over the Canal ever intended. On the contrary, the acts of concession
stressed Egypt's right to supervise the Canal, to enforce law and public order, and
to occupy any point on the borders of the Canal whenever this was deemed necessary
for the defense of the country, as a manifestation of sovereignty over the territory of
the Canal. But the intent of throwing open the Canal to the free navigation of all
nations without distinction of flag was made abundantly clear.
Nor was the Sultan's sovereignty over the Canal's territory restricted by the
provisions of the Convention regulating the use of the Canal signed in Constantinople
on October 29, i888. The Convention of i888 aimed at confirming the practices
that had developed concerning free navigation for all nations, but no surrender of
any sovereign rights was ever contemplated. For if the Sultan had given away any
of his sovereign rights, he would have committed an act of servitude in derogation
of his sovereignty over Egypt. The first principle governing the present status of the
Suez Canal is, therefore, the principle of territorial sovereignty which was recognized
by the signatories of the Convention of i888. But to the manner in which the rights
of sovereignty were to be exercised, we shall return later.
Next to the principle of territorial sovereignty is the principle that the Suez Canal
is an "international waterway." This "internationality" was the product of a volun-
tary act on the part of the Ottoman Sultan in an effort to extend the benefits of
free passage through the Canal to all nations without qualifying his sovereign rights.
Even before the construction of the Canal was completed, the intent was, both in
'The concession, concluded with a private company, did not imply an international obligation on
Egypt's behalf and could have been signed by the Khedive without the approval of the Sultan in
accordance with the firman of appointment of the Khedive of 1841. But since the concession contained
an obligation assumed by the two parties toward each other affecting third parties in their undertaking
that they would not discriminate against other parties, and Article 14 of the x866 concession provided
that the canal and its ports would always be open as a neutral passage, the Sultan's approval became
necessary. In the concession of 1866, it was stipulated that the Sultan's ratification was necessary. For
texts of the acts of concession and the firmans of ratification, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 6392,
THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM: A DOCUMENTARY PUBLICATION 1-16 (1956); B. BoUTRos-GHALt, LE CANAL DE
SUEZ, 1854-1957: CHRONOLOGIE DOCUMENT to (1958); 1 J. Htntwrrz, DIPLOMAcY Iu THE NEARt AND
MIDDLE EAST 146-49 (1956).
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the acts of concession as well as in unilateral declarations, to grant the right of
free navigation to all nations. Article 14 of the Concession of 1856 reads:
We solemnly declare, for ourselves and our successors, subject to ratification by
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, that the great maritime canal from Suez to
Pelusium and the ports belonging to it shall be open forever, as neutral passages, to
every merchant vessel crossing from one sea to the other, without any distinction,
exclusion, or preference with respect to persons or nationalities, in consideration of
the payment of the fees, and compliance with the regulations established by the
universal company, the concession-holder, for the use of the said canal and its
appurtenances.6
In this, as well as in other relevant declarations of unilateral nature, the purpose
was to assure the company and all nations that the canal would always be open to
free navigation. Notwithstanding these declarations, as one Israeli writer stated,
"[t]he passage of ships was not a right but a privilege granted by the Ottoman
Empire to other nations."7 It is also questionable that a right was established by the
Sultan's declaration made at a conference held in Constantinople, in 1873, to deal with
technical matters, in which he said:
It is understood that no modification, for the future, of the conditions for the
passage through the Canal shall be permitted, whether in regard to the navigation
toll or the dues for towage, anchorage, pilotage, etc., except with the consent of the
Sublime Porte, which will not take any decision on the subject without previously
coming to an understanding with the principal Powers interested therein.8
Some writers have argued, on the analogy of the Eastern Greenland Case, that
the unilateral declaration of a Foreign Minister on behalf of his country, would be
"binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs."9  Such a declaration
was, in that case, held by the Permanent Court of International Justice to be binding
on the country making it. The so-called "Ihlen doctrine" may or may not be
accepted, but it is of no great significance to our discussion, since an internationally
binding act had been accepted by the Ottoman Porte in i888 which established
beyond any doubt the international character of the Suez Canal.
In the preamble of the Constantinople Convention" (October 29, i888), the nine
signatory Powers" stated that their intention was to establish "a definitive system
intended to guarantee, at all times and to all the Powers, the free use of the Suez
Maritime Canal, and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of
I THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM, supra note 5, at 7; B. BouTRos-GHALT, supra note 5, at 6; and i J.
HUREWTZ, stupra note 5, at 148.
'B. AVRAM, supra note 4, at 31.
' Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commercial i9, C. 1075, at 319.
' [1933] P.C.i.l., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 21, 71.
For English text of the Convention, see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commercial, No. 2,
Suez Canal, C. 5623 (1889); THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM, supra note 5, at x6-2o; B. Bourros-GHlALI, supra
note 5, at x6; 1 J. HUREWITZ, supra note 5, at 202-05.
"I Tey" were Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain,
and Turkey.
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this Canal had been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated
February 22, i866 . ... "
Morec-ver, the preamble indicates the principle of "internationality" as having
evolved from the inception of the Canal and that the Convention was to "complete"
the legal status envisioned in early declarations. As a legal obligation, however, it
is Article i, specifying free navigation to all nations, which established the principle
of internationality to include freedom of passage in time of war and peace. Article
x reads: "The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war
as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of
flag. Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere
with the free use of the canal, in time of war as in time of peace."
In order to insure "free navigation," it was realized that a "guarantee," as stated
in the preamble, was necessary. To achieve such a guarantee, the signatories pro-
vided, under Article 2, that: "They undertake not to interfere in any way with
security of that Canal and its branches, the working of which shall not be the
object of any attempt at obstruction."
This "security" of the Canal was to be guaranteed by the acceptance of another
principle, already stated in earlier declarations, that the Canal would be neutral,
although the term neutrality is not used in the text of the Convention. Article 4
reads:
The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage . . . , no
.right of war, act of hostility or act having for its purpose to interfere with the free
navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports ... even
though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.
All other acts on the part of belligerent Powers were forbidden in the Canal and
its ports. Moreover, the Canal, as Article i further states, "shall never be submitted
to the exercise of the right of blockade." The legal consequence of these stipulations
is that the Canal, in time of war, shall be excluded from the area of warfare.
12
Thus, the neutrality of the Suez Canal, even if the Ottoman Empire were one
of the belligerent Powers, is the third principle governing the present legal status
of the Canal. Various terms have been used to characterize this neutral regime, from
"inviolability" to "neutralization," but this should be distinguished from the neutral-
ization of states13
The three principles of territorial sovereignty, internationality, and neutrality
"1 This means that the neutral zone should be excluded from the region where war can lawfully
be prepared or waged.
" See J. ODIETA, supra note 4, at 68-69. Colombos, however, held a different point of view
on the Canal's neutrality. He said: ". . . the Suez Canal is not neutralized in the proper sense of
the term, since neutrality does not admit the passage of belligerent forces across a territory . . . . It
is only subject to a particular regime for the purpose of withdrawing it from all acts of hostility within
its waters and protecting it from any damage or any attempt to close it to the detriment of the World's
navigation." C. COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA 175 ( 4 th cd. g6i).
CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO IsRAEL 151
have been assessed differently by various writers. Some, stressing internationality and
neutrality, have maintained that sovereignty was restricted by the Convention of
I888 which imposed a "perpetual servitude" over Egypt in the area of the Suez
Canal. 4 Others, rejecting the imposition of an international servitude, stressed the
overriding principle of territorial sovereignty and recognize neither an international
character for the Canal nor an implied neutrality in its zone. 5 The latter position
has been maintained by writers who either tried to defend Egypt's position on the
closure of the Canal against Israel or pushed to the extreme the doctrine of terri-
torial sovereignty in the relationship among states. On the other hand, the writers
who argued the case of Israel's claim to free passage have stressed Egypt's interna-
tional obligations under the Convention of i888 without qualifications. A third
position, however, may be maintained in which Egypt's contractual obligations may
be respected without compromising the doctrine of sovereignty. This is the position
taken in this paper.
II
ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO THE RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE
THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL
Since its establishment more than two decades ago, Israel has repeatedly demanded
the same right of free passage through the Suez Canal enjoyed by other nations,
and has claimed that Egypt's closure of the Canal to its shipping had been done in
violation of the general principles of international law, of the Convention of i888,
and of the Armistice Agreement of 1949. Let us examine Israel's complaints from
these three legal angles.
Under the general principles of international law, according to Israel, all nations
possess the right to navigate freely on the high seas, through international waterways
that connect high seas, and through international rivers. This right, according to
Israel, is "a cornerstone" of international law, and, therefore, cannot be denied to
her as one of the members of the international community.
In the specific case of the Suez Canal, the right of free passage, clearly stated in
the Constantinople Convention of 1888, was, in this area, to be enjoyed by all nations
without distinction of flag. Israel, as one of the nations presumably included under
the general term "without distinction of flag," was therefore entitled to enjoy the
same right as other nations, but Egypt is alleged to have denied Israel such right in
violation of the general principle of international law and of her obligations under
the Convention of i888.
Moreover, Egypt's restrictive measures, according to Israel, constitute an act of
war in the Canal waters contrary to Articles I and 4 of the Convention of 1888, on
1 See B. AVRAM, supra note 4, at 48-50.
1See Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 Am. J. Iwr'L L.
300-03 (x957).
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the ground that Egypt possessed no right to take defensive measures in the Canal
Zone.' Egypt proceeded to act on the assumption that she was at war with Israel,
but this assumption was not justified, according to Israel, because no state-other
than the Arab states-recognized such a state of war to have existed. On the con-
trary, the United Nations had on more than one occasion called on Egypt to open
the Suez Canal presumably on the assumption that Egypt and Israel, as peace-loving
members of that Organization, can no longer remain at war with one another. If
they had ever been at war, as the Arab states held, such a state of war must be super-
seded by membership in the United Nations. 7
Finally, the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel (February 24, 1949)18
has prohibited hostile acts. According to Israel, not only war in the military sense,
but also the state of war between her and Egypt had been terminated. As stated
by an Israeli jurist, the Agreement was intended to achieve four aims:
i. To facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace and
bring all hostilities to an end.
2. To fulfill the obligation of the Security Council to act with respect to threats
to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.
3. To delineate permanent demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces of
the respective parties should not move.
4. To provide for the withdrawal and reduction of armed forces in order to insure
the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace.10
These aims, intended to establish eventual peace between Egypt and Israel, have
been endorsed by the United Nations resolutions of 1949 and of 1951, which
explicitly called upon Egypt to open the Suez Canal. Egypt's refusal to open the
Canal, according to Israel, was a violation of both the Armistice Agreement and the
United Nations Security Council resolutions of 1949 and 195.20
Egypt, however, has refused to accept the charge that she has denied Israel's right
of free passage in violation of international law. Israel has put forth a claim to
free passage under international law on the ground that the Suez Canal-like any
other strait-is an international waterway and, therefore, according to her, should be
open to free navigation. But should the Suez Canal, even if regarded as an interna-
tional waterway, be treated as other waterways, like straits, and, therefore, as subject
to the same rules of international law? Straits, as "natural" waterways provided
'9 U.N. SCOR, 65 8th meeting 1-25 (i954). See also B. AvRAm, supra note 4, at 1i9-2.
"'This viewpoint is based on the assumption that members of the United Nations arc peace-loving
members and therefore no one can be at war with another member without violating the Charter of
this organization. See H. KELSEN, THE LAw AND THE UNITED NATIONS 69 (1950); AND L.M. BLOOMFIELD,
EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE GULF OF AQABA IN INTERNATIONAL LAw x64 (1957).
18 42 U.N.T.S. 251, no. 654. See also 2 J. HuREwrTz, supra note 5, at 299-304.
IS. ROSENNE, ISRAEL'S ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITH THE ARAB STATES 33 (1951).
20 See note I supra. For an interpretation of these views, see Gross, Passage Through the Suez
Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo and Israel Ships, 51 At. J. INT'L L. 53o-68 (1957).
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by nature, have existed from time immemorial and, therefore, the free passage enjoyed
by all nations must be distinguished from free passage through canals which have
been artificially constructed. Before a canal is opened, its territory must be under the
control of some state sovereignty. Canals must, therefore, fall in a different category
from straits, because they are artificial waterways opened by the express or tacit
approval of the sovereign power and, ipso jure, the consent of the sovereign power
must be first obtained. If the sovereign grants free passage by an express declaration
or by an obligation under a treaty or an international agreement, it is the legal
obligation undertaken by the sovereign which entitles other nations to enjoy free
passage, rather than the geographical analogy with natural waterways.2 '
In the case of the Suez Canal, it was the Convention of i888 rather than the
general principles of international law that granted the right of free passage to other
nations. If Israel possesses any right to enjoy free passage through the canal, such
right must be derived from the aggregate right granted to other nations and not by an
analogy with natural waterways which nations ordinarily enjoy under international
law.
The Convention of i888 merely confirmed the right of free passage already recog-
nized by the Ottoman Porte before 1888 and the powers that signed this convention
acquired such rights both in time of peace and war. At the time of signature, other
nations were invited to adhere to the Convention, but failed to do so. With regard
to non-signatory states, the question whether the Convention is obligatory on them is
an open one. Israel may be said to fall in a different category of non-signatory states.
As a successor state, would she not, like Egypt, be entitled to special rights?
There is no question that Egypt, already mentioned in the Convention, was
granted special rights as the country immediately connected with the canal, and
certain obligations were imposed on her.Y2 Egypt, according to the general principles
of international law, must also accept the obligations already undertaken on her
behalf by the former sovereign power. Moreover, Egypt has formally declared its
acceptance of the obligations under the Convention of i888 after independence on
more than one occasionP
1 "Unlike international rivers and straits, which are natural waterways, international canals
are artificially constructed. This essentially differentiating factor has been overlooked by a number
of writers who, misled by the similarity of regimes to which both international canals as well as
rivers and straits are subject, have tried to find, by an analogy to the latter, a geographical or physical
criterion which would serve to define an international canal."
J. OBIETA, supra note 4, at 24.
"' See Articles 8, 9, so, and 14 of the Convention of 1888. Cf. supra note ii.
"
5 From 1938 in formal statements concerning the Canal following the declaration of independence to
1954, the year of signature of the treaty with Britain for evacuation of the Canal Zone. See, e.g., letter
from Mustafa al Sadik Bey to Lord Perth, April 16, 1938, 195 L.N.T.S. io8 (1939); Agreement between
. . . Egypt and the . . . United Kingdom, October ig, 1954, 2io U.N.T.S. I (1955); Letter from
the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Egypt to the Secretary-General . . . 24 April 1957, 12 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. April-June 1957, at 8, 9, U.N. Doc. S/ 3 818/Add. i (1957); statement by Egyptian Representative
in Security Council, 2 U.N. SCOR 1756 (1947).
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Unlike Egypt, however, Israel falls in a special category. First, she has not
adhered to the Convention of i888, which has an accession clause, and therefore may
enjoy the right of free passage in time of peace like other non-signatory states to
whom the right of free passage was granted before i888, but not the right of free
passage in time of war which was granted under the Convention of that year.
Second, if Israel may be considered to have adhered tacitly, she must have acquired
not only the right to enjoy the right of free passage, but also the obligations of
the Convention. Such obligations, for instance, require that the Canal must
remain neutral and not involved in the area in which war is lawfully waged, and
that the Canal should not be subject to blockade. Obviously Israel has neither
declared her acceptance of such obligations nor, since she carried her military opera-
tions to its very eastern bank, has she respected the neutralization of the Suez Canal.24
Third, Egypt's territory has become the subject of an Israeli attack in 1967, which
raises the question of Egypt's right to take defensive measures irrespective of whether
Israel possesses the right of free passage or not. This latter point, so significantly
affecting the status of the Canal, deserves to be treated separately in the following
section, concerned with Egypt's right to control the Canal.
It follows from our foregoing argument that if Israel were not involved in a war
with Egypt-a war in which Egypt closed the Canal as a defensive measure-Israel
would be entitled to the right of free passage. There can be no doubt that Israel's
attack on Egyptian territory on June 5, 1967, presumably to settle a dispute by force
rather than by peaceful methods as provided by the Charter of the United Nations,
was an act of war which justified Egypt's position concerning the security of the
Suez Canal, since, as noted above, Israel was not entitled to enjoy the same rights
and obligations as a signatory of the Convention of 1888. As a third party beneficiary,
a right concerning which jurists are not all in agreement,25 Israel might claim to
enjoy certain rights to use the Canal. But in a war which Israel initiated, and in which
it attacked the territorial Zone of the Canal, Egypt would be empowered to close
the Canal in self-defense, no less by general law than by the very provisions of the
Convention of i888 which obligate Egypt to take measures to prohibit any state
from conducting war in the Canal Zone2
A controversy has raged among several writers as to whether a state of war
existed between Egypt and Israel before June 5, 1967. Those who defend Israel's
right to free passage through the Canal hold that belligerency between the two
states created by the Palestine war of I948-49 was terminated by the Armistice
"
4 Although Israel did not reach the Canal Zone in the invasion of Sinai in x956, in the June war she
reached and asserted control over the eastern bank of the Canal in violation of Articles x and 4 of the
Convention. See notes ix and x2 supra.
25 See Low McNix,, IAw Os TEAtaxss 309-21 (196i); HARvARD RESEARCH IN INTERMATMoAL LAW:
LAw Os TREATIES 924 (J. Garner ed. 1935).
2" In practice this seems to have been the position maintained by the Ottoman Porte and later Egypt
since x888. See J. OmETA, supra note 4, at 79-87.
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Agreement of February 28, 1949 .27 Moreover, the Security Council resolution of
September i, 1951, calling upon Egypt to open the Canal to Israeli shipping on the
ground that hostilities had been terminated by the armistice of 1949, was asserted by
some to be binding on Egypt. Egypt, according to those who supported this view-
point, has violated the Convention of 1888 and ignored the resolution of the
Security Council. 8 Those who hold an opposing viewpoint argue that the Armistice
Agreement of 1949 did not terminate the state of war, since an armistice puts an
end to fighting but does not establish peace. Only a peace treaty can terminate
the state of war and establish peace.20 Moreover, the Security Council resolution,
based on the assumption that the intent of the Armistice Agreement was to establish
peace, cannot be regarded as binding on Egypt without her consent, because the
resolution was recommendatory and not mandatory in nature y3
The controversy between these opposing viewpoints is deemed outside the scope
of this paper, which deals with the problem of the closure of the Suez Canal in the
circumstances created by the war of 1967. Even if a state of war had not existed
before June 5, 1967, Egypt's decision to keep the Canal closed to Israeli shipping
after the June war would be justified by the measures necessary for self-defense
against sudden attack on the ground that the closure of the Canal against a non-
signatory to the Convention falls within Egypt's sovereign rights.
Finally, it may be asked to what extent Egypt's obligations under the Convention
of i888 have restricted her sovereign rights over the Canal? This raises the question
of Egypt's right to control the Canal, which falls under the third heading of our
discussion.
III
EGYPT'S RIGHT TO CONTROL OF THE CANAL
The control of the Suez Canal raises the question of the relevance of territorial
sovereignty to the status of the Canal and to what extent it was restricted by an
international agreement. As already stated, the internationality of the Canal may be
regarded as a balancing principle between the doctrine of sovereignty and the
binding obligations of an international agreement. It is in the light of this balance
that Egypt's right of the control of the Canal should be assessed.
'7 See S. ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 82.
"8 See B. AvRAms, supra note 4, at 119.
u For a summary of the Egyptian point of view, see id. at 122-27.
"o For a discussion on the nature of the U.N. resolution, see Halderman, Some International Con-
stitutional Aspects of the Palestine Case, in this symposium, p. 78. Colonel Howard S. Levie makes
the following remarks on the Security Council resolution of 1951:
"It is considered more likely that the Security Council's action was based upon a desire to bring
to an end a situation fraught with potential danger to peace than that it was attempting to change
a long established rule of international law. By now it has surely become fairly obvious that the
Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements did not create even a de facto termination of the war
between those states."
Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 5o Amt. J. INT'L L. 88o, 886 (1956). See 2
L. OPPENHEISS, INTERNATIONAL LAw 546-51 (7 th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
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Admitting her obligations under the Convention of I888, Egypt has held that she
has not violated Article i concerning "free passage" through the Canal, because the
measures taken in time of war were "reasonable and necessary measures" for defense
purposes, as the Egyptian Prize Court of Alexandria states.3' It might be argued
that even "reasonable" and "necessary" measures might be restricted by the Con-
vention of x888, since Articles Io and ii prohibited Egypt from actions, even for the
defense of her territory, because they might interfere with the free use of the Canal.
It is also argued that, as held by the World Court in the Wimbledon case, 32 the
Canal should remain permanently free as an international waterway.
Egypt's insistence on her right to close the Canal against Israeli shipping in time
of war has naturally raised the question as to whether she can close the Canal during
war against any other nations including signatory powers. This seems to be different
from closing the Canal against a country that had attacked Egyptian territory, in-
cluding the Canal Zone. It was in the exercise of her inherent right of self-defense
that Egypt denied free passage to Israel.33 Such a situation seems either to have been
taken for granted by the Convention of 1888, because it falls within the rights of
sovereignty, or left undecided. Egypt's actions might, however, be justified even if
the Convention is held binding upon it to grant free passage to all nations, including
Israel, on the ground of the internationality of the Canal. Any such obligation would
necessarily entail the reciprocal obligation on the part of Israel to respect the neutrality
of the Canal and the territorial sovereignty of Egypt. It cannot be claimed that
Egypt is bound by the Convention in toto regardless of whether Israel accepts the
obligations imposed on the nine signatory powers. Such a rule would dearly be
imposing an international servitude over Egypt in order to grant to Israel the
right of free passage in time of peace and war and denying Egypt the right of self-
defense in case of an attack on her territory. If we take this position, the purposes
of the Convention would be inconsistent with the general principles of international
law which recognize Egypt's right to repudiate restrictive measures on her sovereignty
imposed without her consent. Nor would the Ottoman Porte have agreed to sign
the Convention and acquiesce in such a servitude, because it had consistently
declared before 1888 that its control over the Canal was not to be restricted by
throwing the Canal's doors open to other nations 4
A balancing view of the principle of internationality seems to restrict Egypt's right
to close the Canal in time of peace against any nation including Israel if Egypt's
security were not involved. So long as Israel insists on a right of free passage under
the Convention of 1888 by threatening Egypt's security, Israel seems to pursue a
31The Flying Trader, [19501 Ann. Dig. 440, 446-47 (No. 149) (Prize Court of Alexandria), 7 REv.
EGrPTIENNE DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL 127 (95).
:' [923] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. I.
3 See Baxter, Passage of Ships Through International Waterways in Time of War, 31 BRIT. Yn.
INT'L L. 2o8 (1954).
34 See J. OBIETA, stupra note 4, at 78-87.
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contradictory legal position by invoking one article of the Convention (Article i)
while denying Egypt's right to invoke another (Article io).3 5
In 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, the Security Council passed
a six-point resolution on October 13, 1956, in which it was affirmed that any settle-
ment of the Suez Canal question should, inter alia, meet the following requirements:
(I) free and open transit through the Canal, and (2) respect for Egypt's sovereigntyf6
This resolution seems to embody the balancing principle of internationality by
proposing to grant freedom of navigation without compromising Egypt's sovereignty.
Thus, the balancing principle of internationality must be considered with due respect
to Egypt's sovereignty. The principle of internationality would cease to be a
balancing principle if Egypt were to be denied the right to close the Canal, as a
measure of self-defense, in case of an attack. Israel can claim the right to be a
beneficiary of the principle of internationality if she ceases to present a threat to
Egypt's security, one of her sovereign rights.
CONCLUSION
From the time of the nationalization of the Canal, Egypt has not only reiterated
her affirmation of the binding obligations of the Convention of i888 and her respect
of the principle of free navigation, but also declared that any dispute or disagree-
ments which may arise in respect of that Convention would be settled in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, and that any differences that may arise
concerning the interpretation of that Convention would be referred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. In a letter dated July i8, 1957, addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Egypt accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court in all legal disputes that may arise from the application of the
Convention of 18887 Since Egypt has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court on all legal disputes relating to the Suez Canal, Israel's claim
to the right of free passage through the Canal might well be an appropriate case
to be brought to the International Court for adjudication and might be regarded as
an example for solving other Arab-Israeli issues on the basis of law and justice rather
than force or diplomatic pressures3 8
" Article io, paragraph i, of the Convention of 1888 provides:
"Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not stand in the way of any
measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive in the name of His
Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take
to assure by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order."
Supra note iI.
" S.C. Res. i18.
87 [1956-1957] I.C.J.Y.B. 213-14, 241. Cf. U.N. Doc. S/38i8/Add. x, supra note 23.
" One of the states which supported Security Council resolution 95 (195), calling on Egypt to
open the Suez to Israeli shipping, might either voluntarily or upon Israel's request refer the Suez
Canal dispute to the International Court of Justice in accordance with article 36, para. i, of the statute
of that Court. Article 36, paragraph a, provides: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations
or in treaties and conventions in force." .
